Non-human identity management tools: Which ones cover AI agents

by Sujay ChoubeyNov 20, 202614 min read
AI AgentsAI Use Case

TL;DR: SailPoint, Astrix, Oasis Security, and Entro handle discovery, ownership, and credential rotation for AI agents, and all four score Strong on those three criteria. None of them document inline action-level execution control, which is the capability required to intercept a tool call before it reaches an external API. Astrix Agent Policies come closest to pre-execution control among the four, but the public documentation does not confirm per-call enforcement in the request path, so confirm it with the vendor. For CISOs evaluating NHI security coverage for agents, that gap is the difference between knowing what an agent has access to and controlling what it actually does. Composio's action layer enforces action-level, per-call policy as code in the request path, complementing rather than replacing these platforms.

The NHI management market has matured quickly, but most platforms still operate at the credential level. They can tell you which service accounts exist, who owns them, and when tokens last rotated. That is necessary work. It is not sufficient for AI agents, which acquire permissions dynamically, chain actions across systems, and can be manipulated through prompt injection to act outside their intended scope. The evaluation below scores four platforms on the criteria that matter for AI agent coverage and identifies where the credential layer leaves a gap.

If you need a working definition of non-human identity before evaluating tools, the NHI explainer for AI agents covers the taxonomy. What follows is a tool evaluation.

How to score NHI platforms for AI agent coverage

The evaluation criteria below form a scoring framework that draws on industry guidance on machine and workload identity governance. They are the four criteria used to judge whether a platform can manage an AI agent as a first-class identity subject, not just inventory it.

Criterion

What it covers

Why it matters for AI agents

Discovery

Automated, continuous inventory of agents, MCP servers, and associated NHIs across cloud, SaaS, and endpoints

Agents deploy fast and often without formal review. Shadow agent detection is the baseline requirement.

Ownership

Attribution of every agent to a verified human owner, with transfer on role change

Orphaned agents retain access nobody is monitoring. Ownership is the accountability mechanism.

Credential rotation

Automated, policy-driven rotation with dependency handling

Static credentials on agents are a lateral movement risk. Rotation must not break dependent services.

Action-level control

Inline evaluation of tool calls against policy before execution

Credential-level controls answer "can this agent call this API." Action-level controls answer "should it execute this action right now."

The first three criteria are well-served by the current market. The fourth is where every major platform stops short. The NHI Management FAQ frames it directly: insist on evidence of lifecycle support including discovery, ownership, rotation, expiry, and revocation. For AI agents specifically, that lifecycle must extend to what the agent does with its credentials, not just how those credentials are managed.

SailPoint Agentic Fabric: Broad discovery, rotation via Entro

SailPoint has moved aggressively into AI agent governance. Its Agentic Fabric treats AI agents as first-class identity citizens, and the platform's automated discovery uncovers agents in on-prem and cloud environments, including unsanctioned shadow deployments. The SailPoint framework for governing AI agents documents how new endpoint and browser sensors, SIEM and XDR telemetry, and vault and pipeline NHI discovery bring MCP servers, tools, credentials, and data stores into view.

Ownership is handled through role-change transfer logic. When an employee leaves or changes roles, ownership of their agents transfers automatically rather than leaving orphaned identities. This addresses one of the most persistent NHI security gaps: former employee integrations that persist undetected.

Credential rotation comes through the 2026 acquisition of Entro Security. SailPoint's agentic AI security documentation describes Entro's automated rotation as a native lifecycle step, with NHIDR token behavior monitoring that flags anomalies in real time running alongside it.

Where it stops short: SailPoint's documentation does not claim inline action-level governance as a native capability. NHIDR monitors token behavior and flags anomalies, but it does not evaluate a tool call against policy before the API request executes. That evaluation happens after the fact, in detection mode, not in the request path.

Score for AI agent coverage:

  • Discovery: Strong

  • Ownership: Strong

  • Rotation: Strong

  • Action-level control: Limited (detection-mode, not inline)

Astrix: Strong discovery and ownership, emerging action control

Astrix positions itself as the NHI security platform with explicit AI agent coverage, and its discovery capabilities are well-documented. The platform connects directly to AI platforms across the enterprise, surfacing every registered agent and MCP server, and maps each agent to its associated NHIs, permissions, and accessed environments. The Astrix NHI security overview documents this as automated and continuous.

Ownership mapping assigns each AI agent to a named human stakeholder, so when a shadow agent surfaces, there is a defined person to contact for incident response. This is the mechanism that closes the gap between "we found a shadow agent" and "we know who to call about it."

Astrix has extended its Agent Control Plane (ACP) with Agent Policies, a real-time policy engine that gives security teams direct control over what AI agents are permitted to do. The Astrix Agent Control Plane announcement describes this as enforcement of security guardrails to prevent policy violations and out-of-scope actions.

Where it stops short: Astrix documents that Agent Policies are evaluated before an action executes, which puts the engine closer to pre-execution control than the detection-mode tools above. The public documentation does not specify whether that evaluation runs inline in the request path for each individual tool call, or how policy decisions are logged for denied calls. Until Astrix documents that enforcement point, treat per-call interception as unverified and confirm it directly with the vendor.

Score for AI agent coverage:

  • Discovery: Strong

  • Ownership: Strong

  • Rotation: Strong (automated remediation, including credential rotation and access revocation, is documented by Astrix)

  • Action-level control: Limited (policy engine, not inline execution gates)

Oasis Security: Deep NHI discovery, agent coverage developing

Oasis Security built its reputation on agentless NHI discovery across cloud and SaaS environments. The Oasis asset management documentation describes an NHI discovery engine that creates a complete inventory of identities, tokens, secrets, and vaults, giving security teams visibility across systems without requiring agent installation.

The ownership capability uses an AI-based Ownership Discovery Engine to assign owners for each non-human identity. At scale, manual ownership assignment stalls as the NHI inventory grows, and automated assignment removes that bottleneck. Ownership assignment is the prerequisite for rotation, risk management, and decommissioning, and Oasis automates it.

Credential rotation is handled through pre-configured remediation plans that drive provisioning, vaulting, rotation, and decommissioning without breaking dependent services. Dependency-aware rotation matters in practice: rotating a credential that three downstream services depend on without handling those dependencies breaks dependent services and stalls rotation programs.

Where it stops short: Oasis's Agentic Access Management layer extends the platform to AI agents using intent-based, just-in-time, and ephemeral permissions rather than static roles. According to Oasis Security's vendor profile, comprehensive AI agent-specific action-level governance was under development at time of research. The platform does not currently document inline tool-call evaluation before API execution.

Score for AI agent coverage:

  • Discovery: Strong (agentless, broad NHI coverage)

  • Ownership: Strong (AI-based assignment)

  • Rotation: Strong (dependency-aware)

  • Action-level control: Limited (intent-based JIT permissions, no documented inline interception)

Entro Security: Shadow AI discovery, NHIDR monitoring

Entro Security, now part of SailPoint, built its AI agent coverage around the problem of shadow agents. Its Agentic Governance and Administration pillar uses EDR integrations to surface AI clients and local agent runtimes on workstations, and connects natively with agent foundries including AWS Bedrock and Copilot Studio to discover agents and the NHIs they rely on.

The ownership model attributes every agent to a verified human owner, which MSSP Alert's coverage of Entro's agentic AI extension describes as closing the accountability gap that emerges when development teams spin up agents without proper tagging or oversight. Automated lifecycle management handles credential rotation and decommissioning as part of the ownership workflow.

Entro's NHIDR technology monitors token behavior in real time, detects anomalies, and flags malicious AI tool calls. The SailPoint acquisition announcement describes this as safeguarding against prompt security threats in real time.

Where it stops short: NHIDR is a detection and response layer. It identifies anomalous token behavior after it begins, not before a specific tool call executes. The interception of malicious tool calls happens at the detection layer, not as a policy evaluation in the request path before the API call fires.

Score for AI agent coverage:

  • Discovery: Strong (EDR-based shadow AI detection, native agent platform integration)

  • Ownership: Strong (verified human owner attribution)

  • Rotation: Strong (automated lifecycle step)

  • Action-level control: Limited (NHIDR anomaly detection, no documented inline pre-execution gate)

The action-level gap across all four platforms

Across all four platforms, discovery, ownership, and rotation are well-served, while inline action-level execution control is not documented as a native capability by any of them.

This matters because the threat model for AI agents is different from the threat model for service accounts. A service account with a static credential can be rotated on a schedule. An AI agent with a legitimate credential can be socially engineered through prompt injection to use that credential in ways the credential was never intended to authorize. Aembit's analysis of AI agent credential risk documents this directly: unlike traditional applications, AI agents can be manipulated through prompt injection to reveal or misuse their own credentials.

Token Security's Agentic Pulse research found that 51% of external actions taken by agentic chatbots authenticate with hard-coded credentials rather than OAuth, and 65% of agentic chatbots have never been used since creation. Those are unmonitored credentials with active permissions sitting in your environment.

The Cloud Security Alliance's agentic AI governance research frames the consequence: once an agent is deployed with legitimate credentials and broad access, it can be weaponized into a persistence mechanism, a lateral movement tool, a credential harvester, and a data exfiltration channel, all while operating within the bounds of its authorized permissions. Credential-level governance cannot catch this because the credential itself is valid. The action is the problem.

Microsoft's own authorization and governance guidance for AI agents makes the distinction explicitly: OAuth and API permissions answer "can the agent call this API." They do not answer "should the agent execute this action under business policy, compliance constraints, data boundaries, and approval thresholds."

Where Composio fits: The action layer, not a replacement

Your NHI platform shows which agents exist and who owns them, but it cannot stop an agent with a valid credential from executing a harmful action. Composio closes that gap by enforcing action-level governance at the infrastructure layer, in the request path, before a tool call reaches an external API. It is not an NHI discovery platform and does not compete with SailPoint, Astrix, Oasis, or Entro on inventory, ownership attribution, or credential rotation.

The architecture works like this: an admin sets which actions are permitted per user, per role. Those restrictions are enforced as code in the request path before the LLM is involved in any decision. If an admin disables the delete action for a Slack integration, the agent cannot delete, regardless of what the prompt contains, what the model reasons, or what a prompt injection attempts.

Credentials are stored with AES-256 encryption and isolated from the LLM context and application code. The agent calls a tool, Composio resolves the credential inside an isolated runtime, injects it into the outbound request, and returns only the response. The credential never reaches the model. This is the structural answer to the prompt injection credential risk that NHI rotation schedules cannot address.

Composio's Logs API records each tool call with its outcome, marked as success or failed. If your audit process requires a denied-call trail, plan to capture that evidence in your NHI platform or SIEM alongside the Composio logs.

For CISOs running SailPoint, Astrix, Oasis, or Entro, the integration question has a clear answer: your NHI platform tells you which agents exist and manages their credential lifecycle. Composio's action layer controls what those agents can actually do with their access at execution time. The NHI platform keeps owning discovery, ownership, and rotation, while Composio evaluates each tool call in the request path before it reaches the external API, so a valid credential no longer authorizes every action.

For teams that need to complete a vendor review, Composio’s Trust Center provides information on its SOC 2 Type II and ISO/IEC 27001:2022 certifications. That documentation gives security reviewers structured, ready-to-share evidence for their questionnaires instead of requiring your team to assemble it from multiple systems.

Comparison table: NHI platform scores for AI agent coverage

Capability

SailPoint Agentic Fabric

Astrix

Oasis Security

Entro

AI agent discovery

Strong

Strong

Strong

Strong

Ownership attribution

Strong

Strong

Strong (AI-based)

Strong

Credential rotation

Strong (via Entro)

Strong

Strong

Strong

Action-level governance

Limited (NHIDR detection)

Limited (policy engine)

Limited (JIT intent-based)

Limited (NHIDR anomaly)

Inline tool-call authorization

Not documented

Not documented

Not documented

Not documented

Audit log with denied calls

Not documented

Not documented

Not documented

Yes

The bottom row is the gap. Every platform in this comparison handles the credential lifecycle well. None of them document inline tool-call authorization as a native capability. That is the specific problem Composio's action layer is built to solve.

If you are evaluating how to close the action-level gap your NHI platform leaves open, book a call to walk through your specific security requirements before the next enterprise review.

FAQs

What is non-human identity management?

Non-human identity management is the practice of discovering, governing, and securing the digital credentials that systems, workloads, and automated processes use to authenticate and authorize their actions. The Cloud Security Alliance reports that NHIs outnumber human identities by more than 90 to 1 in many organizations, with some enterprises reporting ratios as high as 144 to 1.

Do NHI platforms cover AI agents natively?

The four platforms covered here (SailPoint, Astrix, Oasis, Entro) all document AI agent discovery and ownership capabilities. None of them document inline action-level execution control as a native capability, which is the control required to intercept a tool call before it reaches an external API.

What is the difference between credential rotation and action-level control?

Credential rotation replaces static credentials on a schedule to limit the window of exposure if a credential is compromised. Action-level control evaluates each specific tool call against policy before execution. Rotation manages the credential, while action-level control governs what the agent does with it.

Why is NHI security different for AI agents than for service accounts?

Service accounts execute predefined tasks with static permissions. AI agents acquire permissions dynamically at runtime, chain actions across systems, and can be manipulated through prompt injection to act outside their intended scope. The CSA's agentic NHI whitepaper documents that the blast radius of an AI agent's credential cannot be fully determined at issuance time because agents acquire permissions dynamically.

How do I evaluate non-human identity management tools for AI agent coverage?

Score platforms on four criteria: discovery (automated, continuous, covers shadow agents), ownership (human attribution with transfer on role change), rotation (automated with dependency handling), and action-level control (inline tool-call evaluation before execution). The NHI Management FAQ recommends mapping metrics to all six lifecycle stages: discovery, ownership, privilege, rotation, detection, and remediation.

Does Composio replace an NHI platform?

No. Composio operates at the action layer, not the credential lifecycle layer. Your NHI platform handles discovery, ownership, and rotation. Composio enforces what agents can do with their access at execution time. The two layers address different parts of the same problem.

Key terms

Non-human identity (NHI): Any digital credential used by a system, workload, application, or automated process to authenticate and authorize its actions. AI agents are the newest and fastest-evolving class of NHI, per the Cloud Security Alliance.

Action-level governance: The evaluation of a specific tool call against policy before the API request executes. Distinct from credential-level controls, which manage access scope but not execution behavior.

NHIDR (Non-Human Identity Detection and Response): Entro's behavioral anomaly detection technology for monitoring token behavior in real time. Operates in detection mode, not as an inline pre-execution gate.

Shadow AI agents: AI agents deployed without formal security review or ownership assignment. Discovered through EDR integrations, endpoint sensors, and agent platform connections rather than manual inventory.

Policy-as-code enforcement: Access restrictions evaluated in the request path as code before the model is involved in any decision. Enforcement holds regardless of prompt content or model reasoning.

Least privilege for AI agents: The principle that an agent should hold only the minimum permissions required for its current task. Complicated by the dynamic permission acquisition behavior of LLM-powered agents, which can accumulate access across deployments without corresponding audit or review, per CSA research on agent identity sprawl.

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