Composio May 2026 security incident update

by ComposioPublished May 21, 2026 · Updated Nov 10, 20264 min read
Updates

Version

Updated November 10, 2026. Composio API responses redact connected-account tokens and custom OAuth client secrets by default. Your application calls tools or Proxy Execute and gets the provider's response back, not a credential. In the default Composio Cloud deployment, Composio still stores and uses those credentials. Token custody architecture shows where the boundary sits.

We disclosed the incident in May. This update summarizes remediation and hardening documented in August. The original disclosure and May timeline remain available, including the revocation guidance. If you haven't already rotated API keys or revoked affected connections, start there.

For a focused explanation of the six credential-security controls, read How Composio rebuilt credential security after May 2026.

What's changed since May

  • Credential access. APIs no longer return connected-account tokens or custom OAuth client secrets.
  • Encryption. OAuth credentials use envelope encryption. API keys and session keys are stored only as hashes.
  • Internal infrastructure. We rebuilt the tool-building service and replaced shared static secrets with OIDC authentication.
  • Customer controls. Scoped keys, IP allowlisting, and customer-managed encryption keys are available.
  • Independent review. AppSecure re-verified fixes for all critical and high findings in its assessment.

The June 4 security, API, and platform changelog records connected-account token redaction and IP allowlisting, and the initial rollout of scoped API keys for Proxy Execute.

Incident and impact

In May 2026, an attacker accessed internal Composio systems and compromised customer credentials. We disclosed the incident, contacted affected customers, and engaged IntrusionOps for independent incident response.

The May disclosure reported leaked connections representing about 0.3% of active connections, including 5,001 GitHub connections. It separately identified 5,241 Composio API keys as potentially exposed. The affected-connection list preserves that distinction.

Credential access and encryption

APIs no longer return connected-account tokens or custom OAuth client secrets. Use Proxy Execute to call provider endpoints without retrieving credentials.

By default, Composio Cloud decrypts credentials in the execution runtime for each call. Your application receives the provider response, but neither it nor the model receives the token.

We replaced single-key encryption with envelope encryption and an independently rotated key-encryption key. Composio API keys and session keys have no recoverable copy. Our security architecture article explains storage and access during execution.

Internal infrastructure

The May disclosure describes an attack through internal tooling and malicious tool definitions. We retired and rebuilt the tool-building service with a third-party security audit. Further hardening replaced shared static secrets with OIDC, tightened infrastructure permissions, and centralized security logging and alerts.

Customer controls

Composio project API keys can be restricted to specific permissions. Default project keys keep full project API key access, so create a scoped key for anything that needs less. Connected-account API responses redact tokens by default, and tool execution and Proxy Execute return provider responses instead of credentials. Customers can also allowlist IP addresses, limit administrative access, restrict each session's tools, and add human approval for sensitive actions in their application. Token custody architecture covers what your application, Composio, and the provider each receive.

Customer-managed KMS places the credential proxy in your cloud. Composio does not hold the keys needed to decrypt those credentials. This is an optional deployment that requires setup with our team.

Composio dashboard Keyring settings for verifying an organization-operated proxy and enabling project routing.

Deleting a connection alone does not guarantee provider-side revocation. Request revocation where supported, or rotate credentials with the provider.

Independent review

These results reflect our August 2026 security whitepaper.

Assessor Scope Result
IntrusionOps Incident investigation and response Validated the investigation and scope, and guided containment and remediation.
AppSecure Security Web application, developer APIs, and both SDKs All critical and high findings remediated and re-verified.
Latacora AWS and GitHub Findings closed and independently confirmed, with remaining items in progress.

Our SOC 2 Type II report is available through the Trust Center resources. For AppSecure's executive summary, the latest remediation status, or KMS setup, contact security@composio.dev.

Original disclosure and timeline

The May disclosure retains the incident timeline, affected connections, indicators of compromise, and credential-revocation guidance. Its investigation updates and planned features describe what we knew in May. Use the version selector to browse earlier updates.

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